

STRATEGY
RESEARCH
PROJECT

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**THE TRANSFORMATION AND RESTRUCTURING
OF THE MILITARY POLICE CORPS**

BY

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THE TRANSFORMATION AND RESTRUCTURING OF THE MILITARY POLICE CORPS

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ABSTRACT

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This paper examines options of how the Military Police Corps might alleviate manpower and force structure shortages that negatively impact their ability to support the warfight, peace operations and peacetime commitments. The options explored include; civilianization, contracting and/or outsourcing for peacetime missions that are currently performed by military police personnel. This paper also provides an assessment of peacetime functions and recommendations for maximizing outsourcing and privatization. This is an alternative strategy to reducing operational programs, continued high OPTEMPO for high demand units/personnel and sacrificing modernization programs.

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THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE MILITARY POLICE CORPS

This paper addresses the transformation of the Military Police Corps as a branch and/or component of the US Army. It is based partially on Chief of Staff, US Army (CSA) Shinseki's Army Transformation Plan, the U.S. Army's Military Police School's Strategic Plan and my personal views of how our strategic leaders should approach the transformation of the Military Police Corps in support of current national security policies. The Army's transformation will have a radical impact on all branches of the Active Component, Reserve and National Guard. The impact will be felt across the full spectrum, from the operational Army to the institutional Army, from the strategic to the operational and the tactical levels. The Army Transformation Campaign Plan states that "only through implementation of an adaptive and flexible plan that incorporates changes over time, will the transformation survive first contact and the Objective Force Army become a reality."¹

The leadership of the Military Police Corps and the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS) is tasked to transform the Military Police Corps into a multifunctional, full spectrum force. USAMPS has published the USAMPS vision and goals that support, in part, the Army Transformation Campaign Plan (TCP) and the CSA's stated goals and objectives for achieving the Army's transformation. The current Military Police Corps vision and transformation plan is a step in the right direction; however, in my view they fall short of the radical changes needed to reallocate resources or fully support the National Security Strategy (NSS) or the TCP. The NSS calls for the MP Corps to integrate and synchronize all forces to maximize their efforts and efficiencies. One of the major stated objectives of the TCP is to incorporate the support of the Institutional Army including schools, services, facilities and installations that contribute directly to the ability of the deployed force to meet its mission requirements. The cornerstone of the TCP is the conversion of the Interim Combat Brigade Team (ICBT). However, the ICBT does not possess any organic MP units; therefore, it has little impact on the force structure or transformation of the MP Corps. The divisional MP Companies (approximately 100 personnel each) will likely transform due to their direct support role to the ICBTs. The division MP companies that support the ICBTs would be scheduled for high-technological improvements and modernizations, but that does not modernize or relieve the low density high-demand (LDHD) Combat Support MP units. In the absence of specific guidance for the transformation of the majority of MP units, the Corp must take the initiative to transform the bulk of the MP units remaining in the force structure to insure it meets its warfighting missions and commitments to on-going contingency operations. I contend that in order to meet the requirements found in the NSS and CSA's guidance, the MP Corps must look for innovative ways to transform and

restructure. In this continued “zero-sum game” or no-growth environment, we must drastically reduce/restructure the TDA forces that support the peacetime, non-war-fighting missions in order to provide additional combat support assets where they are needed. One way to effectively re-organize and transform the Corps is to eliminate MP units and specialties that perform uniquely peacetime functions. The two most obvious peacetime missions/functions are confinement/corrections specialists and select law enforcement functions. If they were eliminated the Corps could also eliminate or redirect the TDA institutional structure that trains personnel for and supports the confinement mission. Secondly, the army should explore the option of contracting and/or civilianizing the majority of the peacetime security, law enforcement functions. The Corps should convert all corrections positions, the correction training base and select law enforcement positions into highly deployable, combat support personnel and deployable MP units.

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND POLICIES DICTATE MILITARY FORCE STRUCTURE

Our force structure is determined by a number of documents, complex processes, strategies and programs. Our overall defense strategy must provide adequate forces and modernization programs to successfully perform the full spectrum of missions. “The problems inherent to our current strategy and force-sizing paradigm derive largely from a chronic strategy-capability mismatch and have put the military on a glide path to unacceptable risk. The trend can and must be reversed. As we engage in this new security debate, we must consider carefully the full range of capabilities required for comprehensive security in an evolving strategic and operational environment.”² It is time to abandon the old metrics to determine force structure, force mix and sizing. A number of politicians and military leaders have come to the realization that the two major theater of war (MTW) requirements do not adequately address the Army’s force structure needs. “This argument was based on the experiences of the first decade of post- Cold War. During that time the operational commitment of U.S. military forces has increased 300 percent, and the vast majority of the deployments have been to low end of the spectrum of conflict— shaping activities and smaller scale contingencies, not MTWs.”³

Many Combat Support (CS) elements, to include MPs, did not have adequate force structure or divisional support units in the force to support the two MTW strategy. This shortfall remained when the Army transitioned from its Cold War strategy to the Base Force strategy. The Base Force strategy de-emphasized containment of the Soviet Union and focused on regional threats to US interest. The size of the force was based on the capabilities necessary to counter regional threats and not the capability to fight two conventional MTW. The Base Force

was supposed to be the minimum force required to balance US interests and called for substantial reduction of 25 percent of force structure and a 10 percent reduction of defense budget. However, the Oct 1990 budget required deeper budget cuts of 25 percent. Additional substantial budget cuts were made, especially to long-term modernization projects.

The 1992 National Military Strategy (NMS) outlined the four foundations for our strategy: strategic deterrence/defense, forward presence, crisis response and reconstitution. The NMS was based on the faulty assumption that we would not have significant commitments for deployments or long-duration contingency operations. Although the unlikelihood of a high-intensity, conventional MTWs was evident, policy maker were unable to foresee changes in the spectrum of threat and/or the increase in Lesser Regional Conflicts (LRCs). The 1997 NMS acknowledges that "the US military will be called upon to respond to crisis across a full range of military operations, from humanitarian assistance to fighting and winning major theater wars (MTW), and conducting smaller-scale contingencies. Our demonstrated ability to respond and to decisively resolve crises provides the most effective deterrent and sets future operations if force must be used. Should deterrence fail, it is imperative that the United States be able to defeat aggression of any kind."⁴ Our NMS is designed to shape the international environment by promoting peace and stability. It acknowledges that we accomplish that through participating in LRCs. It further states that, "swift action by military forces may sometimes be the best way to prevent, contain, or resolve regional conflicts, thereby precluding greater effort and increased risk later."⁵ As the number of Smaller Scale Contingencies (SSCs) increases so does the risk factor.

Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD 63) outlines our nation's commitment to involvement in peace operations and operations other than war. The intent of PDD 63 is to explain "the need for complex operations is likely to recur in future years, demanding varying degrees of U.S. involvement. The PDD calls for all U.S. Government agencies to institutionalize what we have learned from our recent experiences and to continue the process of improving the planning and management of complex contingency operations. The PDD is designed to ensure that the lessons learned --- including proven planning processes and implementation mechanisms----will be incorporated into the interagency process on a regular basis. The PDD intent is to establish these management practices to achieve unity of effort among U.S. Government agencies and international organizations engaged in complex contingency operations."⁶ This directive also stressed that peace operation are to be more defined and linked to political solutions. Despite this additional guidance our participation in peace

operations continues to skyrocket and DOD has yet to apply a method of determining force structure requirements or to properly integrate these requirements into the funding cycle.

The NSS states that "Smaller-Scale Contingency (SSC) operations encompass the full range of military operations short of a major theater warfare, including peacekeeping operations, enforcing embargoes and no-fly zone, evacuating US citizens, reinforcing key allies, neutralizing NBC weapons facilities, supporting counter-drug operations, protecting freedom of navigation in international waters, providing disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, coping with mass migration, and engaging in information operations. These challenging operations are likely to arise frequently and require significant commitments of human and fiscal resources over time."⁷ The NSS implies that we will remain engaged in peace operation and/or SSC, to some degree in the future. "A primary element of our strategy of engagement has been to help fashion a new international system that promotes peace, stability, and prosperity. This has involved remolding and shaping both sides of the Cold War bipolar system. It has meant both adapting our alliances and encouraging the reorientation of other states, including former adversaries."⁸

A recent RAND study noted an emerging gap that followed the 1989 Base Force, 1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR), and the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The RAND study "analysis demonstrates the emergence of a growing gap between defense strategy, the force structure intended to support the strategy, and the amount of resources allotted to defense program. The report indicates the future defense reviews need to better assess how changes in strategy might potentially affect force employment and readiness. Increased attention should also be given to determining costs of funding a reasonable-risk strategy and force structure, and to long-term modernization and transformation of the force."⁹ Gaps between strategy, force structure and resources continue to exist. While there have been substantial reductions in manpower and force structure; minimal reshaping, modernization, risk calculation or transformation has taken place. Transformation and modernization of the force and unit readiness have been the "billpayer" for budgetary shortfalls.

The 1993 BUR acknowledged the need for increased participation in peace-keeping and humanitarian operations, but still proposed a reduction of the force. "The BUR proposed reductions of about one third from FY1990 levels and promoted additional manpower cuts of 160,000 active personnel and 115 civilians."¹⁰ These force reductions and projected savings were based on the change in strategy from winning one MTW while holding, and later winning, a second MTW. So, although the BUR acknowledged the need for peace operations it did not abandon the MTW as its yardstick or metric. The result was an overall reduction of forces. As the overall force was reduced, so were the military police units. The BUR did not adequately

assess future commitments to lesser/smaller scale contingencies, inadequate disengagement strategies or their impact on unit readiness. This resulted in the migration of funds from operations to support accounts and cuts in force modernization programs that directly impact future warfighting capabilities.

Although the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) maintained the strategy of two nearly-simultaneous MTWs as the basis for force sizing, there was an increased emphasis on an active engagement strategy and crisis response while maintaining the capability to shape, respond and prepare. Therefore, there were only modest changes to the force structure coupled with an additional percent in manpower reductions. Overall, the 2001 QDR made marginal changes to national defense strategy. These modest changes may not meet the needs of the Congress or DoD's expectations of radical change or dramatic transformation. "The QDR did not resolve the imbalances that had developed over the implementation of the BUR. In, Fact its flat budget underestimated the resources needed to support the defense program. By the fall of 1998, the service chiefs reported serious readiness problems and said that risks associated with executing the two-conflict strategy had increased."¹¹

None of the previous strategies adequately evaluate the impact of our remaining warfighting requirements, let alone address the TDA/peacetime assets and functions. DoD must conduct an in-depth analysis of the Army's roles, missions, strategy, functions and capabilities in order to successfully restructure the total force. In accordance with FM 22-100, Army Leadership, strategic leaders are the Army's catalyst for leading change by identifying the force capabilities necessary to accomplish the National Military Strategy, "They establish force structure, allocate resources, communicate strategic vision, and prepare their commands and the Army as a whole for their future roles."¹² As senior leaders we have the responsibility to identify units that do not contribute to the capability-based, full spectrum force that we can no longer afford in the modern Army. Yet, the MP Corps continues to dedicate hundreds of correctional specialists and other low-density manpower, millions of dollars, and a multitude of resources toward a population of U.S. prisoners that will not return to the uniformed Army. The Army Vision states that transformation is contingent on good stewardship of our nation's resources. The Army faces the same challenges as any other large organization with people, equipment, and infrastructure: containing the rising costs of doing business. The MP Corp must pursue ways to curtail costs and identify unnecessary capabilities and resources that do not support the NMS.

Our politicians further aggravate the scarcity of resources. The Base Reduction and Closures (BRAC) Commission realized the necessity of eliminating the costs associated with

maintaining additional, unnecessary base operations. The BRAC Commissions initially identified 40 base closures and base reductions in order to lower operational costs but actual closures fell short of the goal. The services are being forced to retain and maintain excess bases/facilities while simultaneously facing active and reserve force reductions, budget cuts and the loss of modernization programs. The initial manpower cuts were in effect by 2001 but further rounds of base closures were not authorized by Congress. For political and economic reasons, the armed services have become the defunct "billpayer" or "welfare system" for state and federal government jobs. This political decision continues to have devastating impacts on the armed forces.

The time has come to completely re-look and abandon the two MTW strategies as the metrics for force structure. The changing strategy/policy and the increased involvement in peacekeeping operations have severely impacted our force structure, readiness and future warfighting capabilities. "When combined with ongoing missions and responsibilities, the demands of the new focus on fighting terrorism will strain the Army considerably and highlight many shortfalls in force structure. The force that fought and won Operations DESERT STORM is long gone. The current Army is too small to fight a major land war against a state like Iraq without even more coalition land power augmentation than it received in the Gulf War, but it is also deficient in many elements necessary to fight terrorism, provide homeland defense, and conduct peace operations."¹³ Additionally, the policy makers have not defined future risks associated with the loss of funds applied to long-term modernization and transformation programs. Our current strategies also require us to be able to deter and contain such nations as Iraq and North Korea, both with large standing armies. However, the probability of increased military force structure or manpower remains unlikely. "Although small-scale contingencies are becoming more frequent, it would be irresponsible to assume that a major war, or large-scale crisis, will not occur."¹⁴ Therefore, our current task is two-fold. Army leaders must transform our current forces more efficiently in order to meet the ongoing long-term challenges. Additionally, we must look for innovative ways to maximize the limited available resources.

MILITARY POLICE FORCE STRUCTURE AND CURRENT FUNCTIONS / MISSIONS

In 1994 U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) was designated as the Re-engineering Center for the U.S. Army. FORSCOM selected their MP units for the first pilot program to convert peacetime units to warfighting units. The leadership did not reach a consensus on the number or type of units to convert. The FORSCOM Provost Marshal was identified as the lead in the FORSCOM reengineering effort, which resulted in the conversion of FORSCOM TDA

units into modular, tailored MTOE units. From 1994 through 2001 TDA law enforcement military police units were restructured as MTOE units. Although the units were given modular, deployable MTOEs, minimal tactical equipment and/or vehicles were purchased or acquired. MP teams are capable of deploying in support of warfighting units; however, they are reliant on the supported units for sustainability and mobility.

The MP Corps did not attempt to transition corrections/confinement units into warfighting units. As a result there has been no reduction or conversion of peacetime confinement/correction units. Two separate military personnel specialties and separate organizational training support systems remain with their multiple layers of redundant commands, headquarters staffs, support/training personnel and facilities. Therefore, I surmise that the current transformation plan falls short of meeting the future long-term needs of the U.S. Army and the Military Police Corps. To further complicate the transformation effort, the Vice Chief of Staff recently directed that all U.S. Army installations implement access control plans on CONUS installations. This directive further aggravates personnel shortfalls and manning issues for the military police strategic leaders. This directive limits USAMPS and HQDA's ability to prioritize manning for warfighting units. The USAMPS was forced to direct uniformed personnel fills to TDA units for manning gates on U.S. installations. Although this is a viable force protection effort, it negatively impacts on-going contingency missions and warfighting capability by reducing available uniformed military police personnel from the deployable force.

The TCP focuses on the reorganization of the ICBTs at brigade level. However, the majority of the MP force structure authorizations remain at echelons above division (EAD) and echelons above corps (EAC) level. Although the infantry divisions each have one assigned divisional MP company, they are typically not the HDLD units that are being overtaxed. The Combat Support MP Companies (EAC), both AC and RC, are currently deployed in support of increasing contingency operations. This issue is not adequately addressed or resolved by the current MP transformation campaign plan. The MP School has made minor changes to current MP doctrine. In accordance with MP doctrine, current MP Functions and supporting subtasks include, but are not limited to, the following:

- Maneuver and Mobility Support, which include support of river crossing and breaching operations, the passage of lines, straggler control, dislocated civilians, route reconnaissance/ surveillance and main supply route (MSR) regulation enforcement.
- Area Security includes reconnaissance operations, area damage control (ADC), base/ air base defense, response force/TCF, critical sites, asset security, and force protection, and antiterrorism.

- Police Intelligence Operations includes support to intelligence preparation of the battlefield, police information assessment process, information collection and dissemination, joint, interagency, and multinational coordination.
- Law and Order includes law enforcement, criminal investigation, U.S. Custom Operations and related law and order training.
- Internment and Resettlement includes, enemy prisoner of war and civilian internee handling, populace and resettlement of dislocated civilians.

All of the aforementioned MP missions and tasks support the Army missions throughout the spectrum of threat (peace, conflict and wartime). The Military Police Corps' vision statement addresses and retains all of the current military police missions and functions. The mission statement does not address the peacetime functions that do not support the Army's main mission--- the warfight. A significant portion of the military police force structure authorizations remains in the table of distribution and allowances (TDA) that support the peacetime army. For the most part, these military police units are dedicated and equipped to perform law enforcement functions or confinement/correction operations. The specialized confinement/corrections functions utilize a large portion of the MP forces and BASOPs resources. However, these facilities and/or prisoner population make no contributions to the force protection mission, peace operations or the warfight. "To make the Army Vision become a reality, we must transform the Army's business practices as well. Doing business as we have in the past will not allow the Army to simultaneously take care of people, meet readiness requirements, and transition to the objective force. We must improve the efficiency within our organizations by adopting better business practices—focusing on core competencies, outsourcing or privatizing where it makes sense, and streamlining processes to reduce operating costs."¹⁵ It is clearly time to re-look all costly, non-warfighting functions and manpower.

The Military Police Corps continues to evolve in support of on-going, changing missions; however, these changes are evolutionary in nature, not revolutionary. Radical changes in the environment require us to provide maximum support of the Army's transformation. In applying the systems approach to the transformation process, the Military Police Corps could have embraced a change of its basic mission. Current commitments to contingency operations far exceed military police forces and capabilities within the Active Component structure. Therefore, reserve component military police counterparts, both Army Reserve (USAR) and National Guard (NG) are routinely deployed in support of humanitarian and peacekeeping missions. Due to the recent war on terrorism, many NG units are now committed to homeland defense and will not be

available to support on-going OCONUS deployments. Although the current threat of a full-scale war is low, the peacekeeping and humanitarian missions are predicted to escalate. Given our current policy to support SSCs, it is likely that the future OPTEMPO for our combat support military police units will remain extremely high.

STABILITY SUPPORT OPERATIONS (SASO) OR SMALLER SCALE CONTINGENCIES (SSC)

Future commitments to peace operations and other Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) missions continue to increase in order to protect U.S. interest. The minimal, modest changes in our strategy/policy, reductions in force structure, and the increased involvement in peacetime engagements have severely impacted our military operations and missions.

“Certain engagement activities---such as peacekeeping missions based on treaty requirements---must continue even during a crisis.”¹⁶ Statistics provided by the United Nations (U.N.) show increased involvement in peace operations. “Over the past decade, the deployment of military and civilian police has been subjected to wide fluctuations. The decade began with relatively low levels of military and civilian police deployments, with a total strength of approximately 10,000 in the beginning of 1991. The strengths soared and reached their peak at approximately 78,000 in 1993, largely due to the expansions in the United Nations operations in Somalia (UNOSOM II) and the United Nations Protection Force in the former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR).”¹⁷ In addition to the primary warfighting mission, MP units are likely to continue to deploy in support of peace operations, both in conjunction with the United Nations (UN) and in bilateral and/or unilateral operations. MPs continue to deploy in support of on-going contingency missions to include Peace Operations (PO). The POs and humanitarian assistance missions are predicted to continue to rise in both their frequency and duration.

Joint Publication 3-07 is the joint doctrine for military operations other than war. In this joint publication (Pub) the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff sets forth the doctrine and the U.S. Military involvement in multinational and interagency operations. “Military operations other than war (MOOTW) encompasses the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement and combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during and after war.”¹⁸ In addition to providing doctrine for military employment Joint Pub 3-07, Part II, provides the following terms and definitions:

- Peace Operations. Encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace.

- Peace building. Post-conflict actions, predominately diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.
- Peacekeeping. Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease fire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.
- Peacemaking. Encompasses the process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation or other forms of peaceful settlements that arranges and end to a dispute, and resolves issues that led to conflict.
- Peace enforcement. Application of military force, or threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order.

Other MOOTWs that MPs are typically involved in include: humanitarian assistance, noncombatant evacuation operations, recovery operations, and preventive enforcement operations. MPs also participate in military to military relationships and security assistance in support of peacemaking operations. Recent types are: the on-going peacekeeping mission in Bosnia-Herzokovenia and MFO in the Sinai since 1982, two examples of peace enforcement operations are in Kosovo and the UNITAF mission in Somalia from 1992 to 1993, and a peace building mission entails the rebuilding of roadways, schools and training facilities in East Timor. Two recent examples NATO led peace operations are Kosovo and Bosnia.

On-going operations require the employment of the total force--active component, National Guard and reserve component MP units. Numerous TDA and TRADOC augmentees were deployed in support of ongoing contingency operations (for example, MP desk crews, MP Investigation teams, and military working dog teams). The MP Corps has recently converted their TDA law enforcement units into modular deployable MTOE teams. However, they lacked the funding to adequately equip the units. Therefore they rely heavily on other forces in the theater of operation. All force elements that comprise the MP corps must be transformed, efficiently employed, modernized, trained and integrated.

The US Army Forces Command is the force provider for on-going contingency operations. The following chart depicts the recent CONUS MP units that have deployed OCONUS in support of peace operations and MOOTWs in 2000 and 2001. Additional security operations such as the homeland security/CONUS missions such as the Winter Olympics,

Super Bowl, Airport security, border-crossing operations and forward based MP units are not included in the chart.

OPERATION	LOCATION	UNIT	DAYS DEPLOYED
JOINT FORGE	HUNGARY	220 MP CO (NG)	1 OCT 99-29 MAR 00
SFOR 6	HUNGARY	42 MP DET (PEDD)	1 OCT 99-7 MAR 00
	B-H	105 MP CO (NG)	1 OCT 99-6 MAR 00
	B-H	178 MP DET (PEDD)	1 OCT 99-7 MAR 00
	B-H	MCPHER	1 OCT 99-7 MAR 00
	B-H	523 MP DET	1 OCT 99-5 APR 00
	B-H	148 MP DET	1 OCT 99-7 MAR 00
	B-H	177 MP DET	1 OCT 99-10 DEC 99
	B-H	91 MP DET	1 OCT 99-12 DEC 99
	B-H	51 MP DET	1 OCT 99-7 MAR 00
SFOR 7	HUNGARY	64 MP CO	14 MAR- UTC
(SFOR 6 ROLL)	HUNGARY	178 MP CO	18 FEB- UTC
	B-H	984 MP CO	14 FEB- UTC
	B-H	523 MP DET (KM)	18 FEB- UTC
	B-H	42 MP DET	8 MAR - UTC
	B-H	51 MP DET	18 FEB- UTC
	B-H	NTC MP CO	18 FEB- UTC
	B-H	163 MP CO	15 MAR- UTC
SFOR 8	HUNGARY	119 MP CO	28 AUG- UTC
	HUNGARY	42 MP DET	19 SEP-
	B-H	94 MP CO	24 AUG-
	B-H	179 MP DET	1 OCT
	B-H	168 MP DET	19 SEP-
	B-H	51 MP DET	19 SEP-
DETERMINED	QATAR	91 MP DET	- 16 DEC 00
RESPONSE (USN)	QATAR	148 MP DET	- 25 DEC 00
	QATAR	523 MP DET	- 28 DEC 00
DESESRT SPRING	KUWAIT	411 MP CO	14 NOV-27 DEC 00
INTRINSIC ACTION	KUWAIT	977 MP CO (PLT)	14 AUG-23 DEC 00
NTC 01-06	NTC	977 MP CO (PLT)	11 MAR-21 APR 01
SFOR 9	BOSNIA	223 MP CO (NG)	1 FEB-
	BOSNIA	NTC MP CO	23 FEB-
	BOSNIA	179 MP DET	23 FEB
	HUNGARY	41 MP CO (USAR)	8 FEB-
SFOR 3A	KOSOVO	340 MP CO (USAR)	15 MAR 01-
	KOSOVO	391 MP BN-(IR/RC)	15 MAR 01-
	KOSOVO	716 MP BN HHD	15 MAR 01-
	KOSOVO	21 MP CO	15 MAR 01-
	KOSOVO	551 MP CO	15 MAR 01-
KFOR 1B	KOSOVO	65 MP CO	27 NOV 99-12 JUN 00
KFOR 2A	KOSOVO	503 MP BN HHD	26 MAY 00-9 DEC 00
	KOSOVO	108 MP CO	26 MAY 00- 9 DEC 00
	KOSOVO	755 MP CO	26 MAY 00-10 DEC 00
	KOSOVO	530 MP BN HHC (-)	16 MAY 00- 8 DEC 00
KFOR 2B	KOSOVO	258 MP CO	27 NOV
DESERT	SAUDI ARABIA	463 MP CO (-)	1 - 1 OCT 00
(USMTM)	SAUDI ARABIA	978 MP CO (-)	1 OCT 00-
DESERT SPRING	KUWAIT	148 MP DET	13 JUN 00-16 DEC 00
	(CAMP DOHA)	42 MP DET	30 NOV 00-
	KUWAIT	163 MP DET	5-21 SEP 00

	KUWAIT	177 MP DET	25 AUG- 8 SEP 00
DESERT SPRING	SAUDI ARABIA	988 MP CO (-)	2 NOV 99- 26 APR 00
	KUWAIT	179 MP DET	26 JAN 00-17 JUL 00
JTF-B	HONDURAS	988 MP CO (-)	24 MAY 99- 2 JUN 00
	HONDURAS	978 MP CO (-)	5 DEC 99- 7 OCT 00
FP	PANAMA	204 MP CO	1 OCT 99-16 DEC 99
CR BACKFILL	GERMANY	170 MP CO	1 OCT 99- 15 OCT 99
	GERMANY	194 MP CO	1 OCT - 23 OCT 99
	GERMANY	79 MP CO (USAR)	1 OCT 99- 23 APR 00
	GERMANY	88 MP CO (USAR)	6 OCT 99- 23 APR 00
BRIGHT STAR	EGYPT	571 MP CO	1 OCT- 27 NOV 99
	EGYPT	293 MP CO	1 OCT- 27 NOV 99
	EGYPT	504 MP BN (-)	1 OCT - 27 NOV 99
	EGYPT	42 MP DET	13 OCT 99- 20 NOV 99
	EGYPT	NTC MP CO	8 OCT 99-20 NOV 99
	EGYPT	179 MP DET	13 OCT 99- 20 NOV 99
	EGYPT	372 MP CO (USAR)	1 OCT- 3 NOV 99
	EGYPT	339 MP CO (USAR)	30 OCT- 17 NOV 99
	EGYPT	220 MP BDE- (USAR)	10 SEP-22 NOV 99
MFO (SANAI)	EGYPT	66 MP CO (-)	27 JAN - 14 JUL 00
NEW HORIZON	HAITI	258 MP CO (-)	15 JAN -17 MAR 00
	HAITI	209 MP CO (-)	31 MAY- 19 SEP 00
	HAITI	91 MP DET	5 JUN- 11 SEP 00
JTF-B	HONDURAS	978 MP CO	5 DEC 99-2 JUN 00
	HONDURAS	988 MP CO	24 MAY- 30 SEP 00
DOES NOT INCLUDE	CONUS (HLS)		

TABLE 1 MP DEPLOYMENT TABLE

ALTERNATIVE MANPOWER RESOURCES

Rebuilding the country's security infrastructure is a long-term task where both the military and the police have their proper roles. The equation peace = order + justice neatly describes the necessary balance to various components of society. Whereas the military provide the "order part of the equation, working police and judiciary systems are needed to guarantee the "justice" part."¹⁹ Army installations have a shortage of soldiers, as well as DoD police, to perform security operations. The active-component MPs are already over-committed to ongoing combat support and contingency/peace operations. They rely heavily on RC and NG units to support peace operations and humanitarian missions. With the onset of the war on terrorism and evolving requirements for homeland security and homeland defense missions, the MPs need additional augmentation as well as relief from the daily peacetime mission requirements.

There are several options available that would relieve MP units of manpower-intensive, peacetime duties. The MP Corps should maximize the use of DoD police in order to relieve soldiers from performing the daily law enforcement and installation security/force protection mission. Building a trained and ready DoD police force is not without major challenges.

Currently, the Army does not have adequate numbers of military police or DoD police officers to effectively provide law enforcement and force protection for all U.S. Army military installations. With the increased number of deployments it is imperative that we increase the number of DoD police in order to support the homeland defense, force protection, and physical security missions.

The Department of the Army will soon implement new force protection, homeland security (HLS) and homeland defense (HLD) plans to correct a host of deficiencies that make domestic installation vulnerabilities to terrorist attack. It is imperative that the U.S. Government “develop a comprehensive definition of HLS to provide a uniform basis for coordinating the efforts of all federal agencies and deriving mission areas, tasks, and federal responsibilities for each.”²⁰ In the absence of an approved definition the Army anticipates that its mission reads as follows: “Protecting our territory, population, and infrastructure at home by deterring, defending against, and mitigating the effects of all threats to U.S. sovereignty; supporting civil authorities in crisis and consequence management; and helping to ensure the availability, integrity, survivability, and adequacy of critical national assets.”²¹ Currently, the Army does not have adequate number of personnel to protect their installation, provide continued support to contingency operations, and simultaneously train for the warfight. This new expanded role would require additional security personnel as well as the establishment of priorities of resources.

The U.S. congress recently approved the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (PATRIOT) Act (Oct. 25, 2001). The purpose of PATRIOT act is to deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States and around the world. Section 1010 of this act gives temporary authority to contract with local and state governments for performance of security functions at U.S. Military installations. Not notwithstanding title X U.S. Code restrictions, “during the period of time that United states armed forces are engaged in Operation Enduring freedom, and for the period of 180 days thereafter, funds appropriated to the Department of defense may be obligated or expended for the purpose of entering contracts or other agreements of security functions at any military installation or facility in the United States with a proximately local or State government, or combination of such governments, whether or not any such governments is obligated to provide such services to the general public without compensation.”²² This act is a good temporary measure to hire DOD Police and/or Security Guards; however, Army installations should pursue adding permanent, more flexible, trained DoD police forces to their manning authorization documents.

The hiring and training of DoD police and/or security guard personnel is not an easy task. Personnel serving in law enforcement and/or security functions on military installations must meet high standards of physical fitness, trustworthiness, and emotional stability expected of the law enforcement and security profession. These personnel must be capable of working with little to no supervision, and work frequently in isolated locations at, all times, everyday of the year. This profession is very demanding, yet the usual GS entry level is GS4, 5 or 6, depending on the level of experience, the location and type of duties required. The rigid qualifications, shift work (including all major holidays), and low pay grade offer unique human resource management challenges. Additionally, most states require a minimum age limit of 21 years and mandatory security/legal background screening requirements. Currently, DoD police and security guard personnel are locally hired and trained. There are no standardized qualifications and/or training from one military installation to the next.

The DoD police officer qualifications, responsibilities and duties vary. A typical job description may read like the following notices listed by the DoD, Human Resources Services Center in Alexandria, Virginia: "DoD police officers maintain law and order and preserve the peace. They check passes, direct visitors, regulate traffic, conduct preliminary criminal investigations such as robbery, assault, theft, and burglary. They operate complex alarms and telecommunications devices, prepare official police reports and issue traffic summons."²³ Other qualifications may vary, but generally they must be a US citizen, possess a valid drivers license (with a satisfactory driving record), pass background investigations checks and have limited specialized experience or education. Some installations require AA or BS degrees while others only required high school degree or equivalents. DoD police officers' duties and responsibilities vary greatly from those of contracted security guards. Guards' duties are basically static in nature (for example, access control points physical security) and do not involve active law enforcement (for example, apprehensions or criminal investigations).

The greatest variance in fielding a DoD police force is found in the training of new personnel. Some installations/facilities require successful completion of the eight- week Police Training Course at the Federal Enforcement Training Center in Glynco, Georgia. Some installations have adequate expertise and staffs to conduct their own police academies, for example, the US Army MP Brigade at Fort Shafter, Hawaii. Others units have limited training requirements for their officers. The scope of the diversified training requirements and the shortage of qualified trainers and personnel exceeds the abilities of most individual units and installations. The DoD should establish and fund an initiative for the training and recruitment of police personnel. The US Army Military Police School could host this initiative and provide

standardized training and using existing training facilities and instructors. The centralized training, recruitment and employment of DoD police would alleviate the burden on deploying military police units, standardize quality training of DoD police personnel, and provide trained and ready manpower to assist in the on-going war on terrorism, law enforcement and homeland security/defense missions.

INNOVATIVE RESTRUCTURING AND TRANSFORMATION ACROSS THE SERVICES

DoD must apply radical, innovative thinking toward resolving the resource constraints issue. CSA states that, "Achieving this paradigm will require innovative thinking about structure, modernization efforts". Joint Vision 2020 states that "innovation, in its simplest form is the combination of new "things" with new ways" to carry out tasks".²⁴ The TCP and the MP Corps transformation plan is a step in the right direction; however, it has not gone far enough. It must be more aggressive and innovative in its proposed changes

The Army MPs routinely participate in long-term, joint and/or multinational operations, combat support operations and various PKO. On the other hand the USAF and USN MPs/SPs are used almost exclusively in peacetime, with minimal base security, short-term operations. The result is high OPTEMPO for US Army MP units/personnel, to which are scarce but in high demand. TDAs across all service are a potential for cost saving and manpower pools that could be used to support the warfight and to fill the LDHD units. In fact, in support of the CSA's goal of a joint vision we must think joint or purple. I suggest that Joint Vision 2020 and the U.S. Army transformation campaign plan should incorporate specialties from the different branches of service (USAF, USMC and USN). DoD should spearhead an effort that requires all service to scrub all their TDAs and identify duplicated service functions. There is currently no effective method applied across the services to adequately assess the effectiveness or structuring of TDA/Peacetime units and/or functions. DoD should assess all TDA force structure that does not directly support warfighting. For example, the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force (USAF) have consolidated flight training for fixed-wing aircraft. Currently the USAF sponsors all Military Working Dogs Training. All branches of service could consolidate MP and SP law enforcement training.

The MP Corps must also look internally and outsource specific MP functions that do not support warfighting. For example, peacetime installation law enforcement functions and the confinement of US prisoners. Neither of these areas should require uniformed MP personnel. The elimination of the confinement mission would have significant impacts on the Corps' warfighting units. Outsourcing and/or privatizing the security functions and reducing the military

police personnel involvement in the peacetime law enforcement and installation security mission would free up military personnel to fill LDHD units, which would increase readiness while improving capabilities/functions. Additionally, we could combine all peacetime functions with a common DoD Civilian Police force performing all peacetime law enforcement functions. These dramatic changes would significantly increase strategic responsiveness and significantly alleviate the OPTEMPO of combat support MP units.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

Previous Government In Nature studies (GIN) have identified functions that cannot be outsourced or civilianized. Currently, Title X prohibits the outsourcing of US confinement mission. This restriction should be re-looked. The US Army and the MP Corp should transfer the remaining US prisoner population to the Federal Bureau of Prisons (FBOP) and/or local jails. Currently, several installations already have memorandum of agreement or understanding authorizing the use of State or Local jail facilities for short-term confinement. Hundreds of prisoners were also transferred to the FBOP during the downsizing and building of the new US Army Disciplinary Barracks from a 1200 prisoner facility to a 500 capacity facility. This would pave the way to closing all remaining confinement facilities and to incorporating corrections specialists into the combat support MP units. The elimination of the confinement MOS would reduce the redundancy of the training base and staffs at USAMPS. This would entail minimal retraining of the MPs involved but produce significant benefits for the overall MP Corps.

All installations must assess their peacetime law enforcement support needs to support their respective installations and plan to program whatever additional augmentation is required. Additionally, we should require all local commanders to specify the security functions that may be outsourced under Title X. All peacetime security and law enforcement functions that are currently performed by uniformed, military police officers should be re-addressed. DoD should maximize its opportunities to train and employ additional DoD Police where law enforcement officers are needed and/or DoD Security Guards for missions requiring only static security and access control. These are two viable options for military bases, military installations, Army arsenals and critical infrastructure sites. The end result would minimize or even eliminate the peacetime military police mission and yield additional combat support structure.

DoD should change the force restructuring strategy for all non-warfighting, TDA manpower requirements and authorizations. The recommendations currently focus excessively on conserving resources without considering the interaction with warfighting capability. All peacetime functions and capabilities should be reviewed and one standard applied across the

services to maximize outsourcing of peacetime functions (including some GIN and title XI mandated functions). Some of these functions can be transferred from military personnel to DoD Civilians (i.e. law enforcement). DoD should completely divest itself of certain manpower-intensive, costly, peacetime functions (for example, confinement, security, housing/lodging, finance and some medical/engineer services).

The current Installation Management Study should expand to incorporate all peacetime functions across the Army. Simultaneously it should assess the feasibility of consolidating redundant functions among services on a regional basis. For example, DoD might benefit by consolidating redundant functions/services at Bethesda Naval Hospital, Walter Reed Medical Center and numerous VA Hospitals in the Washington, D.C. area. DoD must re-look how it manages the allocation of defense resources to ensure the capabilities of each service. TDA/peacetime assets do not receive the same scrutiny as do warfighting requirements a short-sighted approach to force structuring and resourcing.

CONCLUSION:

The CSA has called on the Army and the MP Corps to make revolutionary changes in the force structure of the army. Although the OPTEMPO will continue to escalate, there is currently no plan for the authorization of additional forces. In this no-growth environment we must take a hard look at the peacetime units. Assessing peacetime functions and maximizing outsourcing and privatization is a more preferable strategy than reducing or "salami-slicing" operational programs, MTOE structure, or modernization programs for warfighting units.

The U.S. Navy polices the majority of its installations with DoD policemen, the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. Air Force use a mixture of DoD Police and Military Police at some installations and strictly active component at others. One Joint or Purple Police force would allow all military police personnel from all services to assume a combat support role and deploy in support of multinational, joint peacekeeping, disaster relief, humanitarian assistance missions as well as tactical missions that threaten the vital interest of the United States. Deploying all branches of service on combat support or contingency missions would require many systemic changes to the training of U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy Police, which currently have no combat support role. Additionally, the U.S. Army is currently the only branch of service that maintains the corrections career field specialty. Eliminating the confinement operations would require significant institutional changes for the USA and require changes to Title X restrictions to outsource or civilianize correction specialists.

There are many possibilities for transforming peacetime specialties and functions within all branches of the Armed forces to reduce redundancy and manpower needed to sustain our peacetime missions. I have touched on a few that affect the law enforcement and corrections functions but many more remain, for example the redundancy of medical specialists and treatment facilities, logistical support on military installations and financial institutions and personnel. The same redundancy is present in our training facilities and the Reserve Component facilities. Our goal should be to develop and support a Joint Armed Forces Transition Plan for the warfight, peace operations, peace-time functions. The MP Corps should spearhead the effort to standardize police functions for all service components.

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ENDNOTES

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² Walter Neal Anderson, Comprehensive Security and a Core Military Capability, In Revising the Two MTW Force Shaping Paradigm (Carlisle Barracks, PA., U.S. Army War College, April 2001), 182

³ John F. Troxell, "Sizing the Force for the 21st Century", In Revising The Two MTW Force Shaping Paradigm, (Carlisle Barracks, PA., U.S. Army War College, April 2001), 20.

⁴ John M. Shalikashvili, National Military Strategy of the United States of America, (The White House, Washington, D.C., 1997), 2.

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⁹ RAND Research Brief, "Balancing Strategy, Forces, and Resources: Lessons for the Current Defense Review", 3. available from <<http://www.rand.org/publications/RB/RB73/>> Internet; accessed 27 December 1997.

¹⁰ Ibid., 3.

¹¹ Ibid., 4.

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¹⁴ Huba Wass de Czege and Antulio J. Echevarria II, A New Strategy and Military Logic For the 21st Century, (Carlisle Barracks, U.S. Army War College, April 2001), 73.

¹⁵ Thomas E. White and General Eric K. Shinseki, A Statement On The Posture Of The United States Army, (United States Army, Government Printing Office, 2001), 1.

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¹⁷ United Nations Peacekeeping From 1991 to 2001, "Statistical Data and Charts, available from <<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/pub/pko.htm>> Internet; accessed 27 December 2001.

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¹⁹ Gilbert A. Nelson, The U.S. Military Role in Supporting The Rule of Law in Peace Operations and Other Complex Contingencies. (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 15 March 2001),4

²⁰ Antulio J. Echeverria II, The Army and Homeland Security: A Strategic Perspective, (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, March 2001),6.

²¹ Ibid 7.

²² Congress, Senate, (Oct. 25, 2001), "Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (Oct. 25, 2001)." available from<http://www.eff.org/privacy/surveillance/terrorism_militias/20011025_hr3162_usa_patriot_bill.html>; Internet; accessed 26 March 2002.

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